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ACCOUNTING HISTORY AND
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Abstract: This paper examines historical methodology and suggests
ways accounting history may be made more relevant to contemporary accounting researchers. First there is a brief discussion of the
"traditional" accounting history method, the documentary model,
and an examination of history methodologies that offer alternatives
modes of inquiry. This includes the pattern model and rhetorical
analysis. This discussion is brief and focused on only issues examined
in subsequent discussion of the empirical research. The discussion of
the empirical research, including behavioral research, focuses on
three issues: retrodiction, with examples concerning securities legislation; belief transference, with examples concerning the demand for
auditing; and methodological transference, with examples from the
behavioral literature including a discussion of the importance of historical context and sensitivity. The objectives are [1] to show how all
researchers need to tell more plausible stories and how historical
analyses can clarify and enhance understanding of the complex environment in which accountants function, [2] to suggest fruitful areas
for future accounting historical/empirical/behavioral research and [3]
to issue a call for diversity, tolerance, and a free exchange of ideas—
stressing these as values that cannot be separated from accountants'
research activity.

Ball and Foster's [1982] methodological review of empirical
research highlights the difficult tradeoffs that empirical researchers face when attempting to integrate the institutional environment of accounting with the constraints imposed by abstract models borrowed from economics, psychology, statistics,
and mathematics. Ball and Foster address validity issues and
offer several explanations, such as competing world views, as to
why this body of research has been less than convincing, concluding that one reason may be that accounting empiricists do
not tell "plausible" stories. 1 Since, as Williams [1992] points out,
1
Ball and Foster [1982] address four validity issues—internal, construct,
statistical conclusion, and external validity—associated with quasi-experimental
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accounting empiricists rarely test theories, they use theories to
shape empirics into coherent stories, the failure to tell plausible
stories is a fundamental failure.
Accounting historians could contribute meaningfully to the
ongoing empirical debate. If understanding precedes interpretation in any explanatory research project, then historical analyses of topics of interest to empiricists, as well as historical critiques of empirical models, would be useful contributions to the
accounting literature. This paper calls for more historical inquiries to address issues raised in the empirical research, although we do not imply that accounting historians have not
addressed these issues, that is not the case. 2 However, given the
enormous resources that have been expended within the academic community on empirical research over the last three decades, the inconclusive results should be of concern to all accounting academicians. Our overall objective is to stimulate a
dialogue among accounting academicians, particularly between
historians and empiricists and between traditional and critical
accounting historians.
To enable readers to position this paper, the terms—traditional and critical—historical research are defined. 3 The term
traditional refers to historical inquiries that attempt to render
the past familiar, the term, critical, refers to those inquiries that
try to render the familiar, unfamiliar. These two types of research are complementary, although they often result in conflicting interpretations of the historical record. Traditional in-

design and six world views—the six world views are the Accounting Model View
[matching, cost allocation], Economic Reality View [true income theory], Fair
Presentation/Comparability View, Economic Consequences/Firm's Stockholders
View, Economic Consequences to Management View, and Regulatory Compliance View.
2
Positive research is one area that has generated a great deal of historical
attention, see for example, Tinker, et. al. [1982], Mills [1988], Mouck [1989], to
n a m e a few, who have pointed out the limitations of this body of research. See
Mouck [1992] for an interesting rhetorical analysis of why positive research has
been successful and for discussion of dismissal of criticisms, which could be
predicted, given the rhetoric of positivism.
3
The authors accept Ball and Foster's [1992] characterization of the research they examine as empirical, recognizing that some taxonomies would
limit that term to experimental research and label this body of work archival
[See Buckley, et. al., 1976]. Since the empirical usage is common in accounting,
that label is retained since many readers will associate this term with research
that lays claim to scientific status, an important attribute in subsequent discussions.
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quiries attempt to examine the past on its own terms; the objective is to gain an empathetic understanding of why people behaved as they did in a particular circumstance. 4 Critical inquiries focus on how discursive practices or dominant institutions
have served as filters that enable powerful interests in a society
to control others without their knowledge; the objective is to
bring to light the negative and silent aspects of a discipline or
society.
This examination of the explanations offered by accounting
empiricists will be traditional in that the fundamental premise
of economic rationality that underpins accounting empirical research, perhaps the most potent discursive filter in contemporary society, is not challenged. The purpose is to show why,
even if one examines empiricism on its own terms, the stories
that empiricists tell do not always appear plausible. While a
critical historical analysis of empirical research is not conducted, to the extent possible, we suggest the questions that
critical researchers might ask are indicated. Also included is a
brief discussion of the rhetoric of reason to highlight the more
fundamental challenge that a critical perspective would engender with respect to empirical accounting research.
The above analysis is presented because it is important to
establish a meaningful dialogue between traditional and critical
accounting historians. Kuhn's [1970] conclusion that advances
in science do not occur through incremental advances within a
dominant paradigm, but through sharp breaks with that paradigm, certainly gave impetus to critical work in all disciplines.
Accounting has been no exception. By examining how accounting discourses and its calculative techniques serve the dominant
economic interests in a society, support class structures, and
mask societal conflicts, critical accounting histories have highlighted the complex, interactive, and constitutive nature of the
discipline. 5 Critical researchers have rendered the familiar,
4

It is not suggested that reenactment is possible; see Martin [1977] for disc u s s i o n of e m p a t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d w h y m o s t h i s t o r i a n s reject
Collingwood's reenactment model. LaCapra [1985] takes a similar position
when he writes that a good starting strategy for examining a document is to
pretend that the author can talk back and to listen to the argument being presented.
5
See Klamer [1989] for discussion of these attributes of critical research;
accounting critical research has bee informed by a number of different perspectives, for h e r m e n e u t i c a l inquiries (i.e., often called interpretive inquiry,
hermeneutics rejects the idea that there is an a historical, objective truth that
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strange and in doing so have raised a myriad of interesting
questions for accounting historians. This essay is traditional in
that the objective is to examine how accountants have arrived at
their current state of knowledge.
Outline of the Paper
Our discussion starts with a brief overview of the documentary model, explaining why we do not accept the "extreme" form
of that model, as reflective of "traditional" accounting history.
Discussed are some aspects of the model that do have widespread acceptance among traditional accounting historians and
the problems associated with the implicit directionality of the
model. We conclude with a brief examination of two alternative
modes of inquiry, the pattern model and rhetorical analysis,
that can be used to guard against the consensus and continuity
inherent in the documentary model. The discussion of each alternative method is selective in that the focus is only on issues
relevant to subsequent discussion of empirical research.
The next three sections focus on particular, contextual issues raised by empirical research in relation to securities legislation, the emergence of audits in the United States, and the
effect of comparative world views on interpretation of research.
Retrodictive analysis is used to examine securities legislation in
order to show why the pre/post SEC dichotomy found in empirical models appears problematic with respect to financial reporting. Some questions are outlined about interpretations of
empirical results and we suggest areas for future research. The
section concludes with a brief discussion of the rhetoric of reason to highlight how the assumption of economic rationality
structures empirical debate and to highlight questions that critical theorists might ask.
Our discussion of the emergence of demand for audits focuses on belief transference, i.e., imposition of current beliefs
on a prior period. We examine the reasonableness of the relationships (motivation and causality) implicit in the stewardship
exists independent of h u m a n life and culture, instead truth, knowledge and
morality are seen as rooted in social practices and tradition), see Arlington and
Schweiker [1992] and Boland [1989], for labor value and process theory, see
Lehman and Tinker [1987] and Hopper, et. al. [1987], for Foucauldian, see
Hoskin and Macve [1986] and Miller and O'Leary [1987], for feminist theory,
see Shearer and Arlington [1993]; see Tinker and Neimark [1988] for discussion
of historical research from a critical perspective.
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and information hypotheses to determine if belief transference
has occurred. Then, we focus on one specific audit issue, detection of fraud, to explain why economic analyses of auditing may
simply be too narrow to provide an adequate understanding of
the d e m a n d for audit services. We conclude with a brief discussion of critical research, related to auditing, to suggest areas for
future historical research.
In the next section, our focus is on the issue of methodological transference to assess how comparative world views
impact interpretation of research results in behavioral accounting r e s e a r c h . E b b i n g h a u s ' s experimental simplification app r o a c h a n d Bartlett's introspective approach [see Crowder,
1976] are examined to address the issue. We conclude with discussion of the rhetoric of psychology to highlight why it is important for accounting behavioral researchers to be sensitive to
historical context and the rhetorical metaphors they use when
conducting their research.
The concluding section begins with a summarization of
why empirical research has not resulted in plausible stories and
the alternative strategies that could be used for future empirical
research. Implications of this paper for future historical inquiries are discussed. Our message is simple—the accounting academic literature needs to celebrate diversity and keep conversations open if accounting researchers are going to respond adequately to the challenges facing the discipline. A commitment
to a specific criterial s t a n d a r d of knowledge, a scientific
method, will not be sufficient to achieve this objective; instead,
accounting researchers must make a commitment to scientific
mores—tolerance, the free exchange of ideas, and accurate reporting of results.
HISTORICAL RESEARCH
The documentary model has gained almost paradigmatic
status in historical research. The model emphasizes collection
of data, "objectivity" of sources, and sequential [chronological]
analysis. The focus is on identification of regularities that can
be used to give coherence and continuity to a narrative account.
In its extreme form, as outlined by Elton [1967], the historian
becomes an archivist, a simple reporter of facts. 6 This form of
6

See Megill and McCloskey [1989] who note that the extreme form of the
documentary model suggests that a historical accounting is akin to a "lab report
to be written up."
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the model has been rejected by most historians for many years;
it is considered an inadequate description of traditional accounting history, although some accounting historians might
disagree. 7 Traditional accounting history, however, does imply
acceptance of some aspects of the documentary model that
critical accounting historians would (or should) reject.
For example, the documentary model contains an implicit
hierarchy with respect to sources, i.e., primary being more objective t h a n secondary sources. Traditional historians accept
this hierarchy. Since the hierarchy ignores the process by which
documents may process or rework reality, the privileging of primary sources may mask the reconstructive and partisan use (to
legitimize past actions or to close off unwanted prospective alternatives) of historical evidence. Therefore, critical researchers
reject this hierarchy for, as LaCapra [1985] points out, there is
no reason to value the discovery of a new document over a
critical rereading of an old document or the account of a nonparticipant source. However, if one is trying to understand the
actions and motivations of people from their perspective, then
the primary/secondary dichotomy remains important [Potter,
1973, Martin, 1977]. The traditional historian's non-problematic
acceptance of the documentary model's focus on motive, a rationalistic discourse, also would seem to be a distinguishing feature between critical and traditional historians. 8
These two aspects (hierarchy of sources and motivation) of
the documentary model appear to be integral and appropriate
aspects of traditional accounting histories. However, the documentary model's emphasis on sequential analysis, which may be
best described as a continuous time series model, creates a directional bias that Mandelbaum [1977] points out may be inappropriate for specialized histories, like economics and accounting, that deal with cultural artifacts. He argues that the model's

7
See Berlin [1966] and LaCapra [1985] for discussion of why historians have
rejected the extreme form of this model. For an alternative view with respect to
traditional accounting history, see Hopper and Armstrong [1991], for discussion
of critical historiography, see Tinker and Neimark [1988].
8
See Brown [1989] for discussion of the implicit rationality of the concept
of motive; see Anderson [1989] for discussion of work of ethnomethodologists,
who have found that people feel they should be "instructed by reason" so their
retrospective reports of their actions are prepared as if they had been "instructed by rationality." The work being done by ethnomethodologists clearly
has implications for assessment of "primary" sources.
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focus on continuity and coherence makes it difficult for the
historian to recognize discontinuities created by cultural importation, a frequent phenomenon in specialized histories. 9
Conversely, a sequential analysis that focuses on an event as
the terminus of a process, may depict that event as a discontinuity, when it is not. Carr [1961] describes a "critical" historical
event (a discontinuity), as an event that significantly changes
existing relationships. The pattern model, discussed below,
checks the impulse to focus on regularities and provides guidance for determining if an event is a critical event, warranting
periodization.
The Pattern Model
Kaplan [1964] suggested the use of the pattern model for
explanatory research in the social sciences. This model offers a
research tool which enables researchers to deal with complex,
interrelated phenomena. This model, like deductive models,
constructs explanations; the difference is that the pattern model
does so by relating an event to a set of other elements that
together . . . constitute a unified system. Kaplan [1964, p. 33]
defines objectivity as continuously examining evidence to fill in
and extend the pattern as researchers obtain more knowledge.
Complex events are made meaningful by identification of causal
connections; the resultant explanation becomes part of the pattern, but that pattern emerges only retrospectively.
Retrodiction
Porter [1981] combines sequential, analytic and hierarchical analyses to adapt the pattern model to historical inquiry.
The historian uses sequential analysis to highlight regularities,
but this analysis serves primarily as a heuristic for further inquiry. Continuity serves to make novelty intelligible. Porter
[1981] uses the term retrodiction, selecting a point subsequent

9

Cultural importation occurs in accounting when an accounting technique,
practice or theory is found in a nation, although it is inconsistent with the
socioeconomic or cultural structure of the host country. The rather odd groupings that have surfaced in "cluster" analysis of accounting practices that suggest
that the Mexican socioeconomic condition and culture is more like the United
States, than is the United Kingdom's, perhaps best reflect the fact that cultural
importation occurs; see Frank [1979]. Alternatively, these clusters may occur
because the data being analyzed are misleading; see Nobes [1991].
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to an event and working back toward the event, to describe the
analytic phase of historical inquiry. Retrodiction involves more
than reverse sequential analysis in that the effects of an event
emerge and gradually absorb its causal antecedents; the event
and subsequent actions, give new meaning to evidence gathered
in the sequential analysis [Porter, 1981].
For example, actions of any group may be symbolic, designed to respond to external criticism without affecting real
change. Whether an action was symbolic, however, cannot be
known until the event unfolds and subsequent actions give
meaning to evidence previously examined. Retrodiction also increases awareness of any unintended consequences of an event
and makes it easier to identify chance events in the antecedent
period, both important factors in specialized histories. Porter
[1981, p. 35] suggests that historians ask three questions to determine the historical significance of an event, namely "what
happened, what might have happened as well as what happened
[or did not happen] after the event." Significance becomes a
matter of "hindsight." The historian has to do more t h a n look at
"what was" since "what was not" may be of crucial explanatory
importance. This paper's retrodictive analysis of securities legislation focuses on Porter's last question—what did not happen—
to address the question of whether passage of legislation warrants periodization with respect to financial reporting.
Rhetorical

Analysis

Rhetorical analysis is a critical method in that it challenges
the fundamental premise of economic rationality, which underpins all explanatory empirical research in accounting. Rhetorical analysis explicitly rejects the possibility of "objective" evidence, suggesting that historians remain aware of "the political
involvement of all interpretation" [LaCapra, 1985, p. 37]. This
paper examines the critical implications of this form of inquiry
briefly in the concluding section of the discussion of disclosure
legislation, but that analysis focuses on a more traditional problem—transference.
Transference
Rhetorical analysis has provided historians with a powerful
tool to identify transference; this essay focuses on two types of
transference—belief and methodological—relevant to empirical
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research. 1 0 Belief transference occurs when researchers impute
current beliefs to people in different time periods or in different
cultures. A related form of this type of transference occurs when
researchers imply that current beliefs are totally different than
past beliefs. Traditional historians have recognized the dangers
of imposing current beliefs on the past and a rich body of literature exists with respect to this problem. 11 The danger of transference increases exponentially when researchers use a theoretical framework to explain a particular historical phenomenon.
The theoretical assumptions must reasonably reflect existing
conditions in the particular time period or the theory will have
little explanatory power [Kaplan, 1964]. The examination of
agency theory explanations of emergence of demand for audits
in this paper focuses on this issue. Transference also can occur
in disciplinary or subdisciplinary debates. LaCapra [1985, p. 73]
concludes that research might be blindest when "disciplinary or
subdisciplinary boundaries and protocols of research become
the foundation for a self-enclosed frame for reference that induces the methodological scapegoating—the exclusion or reduction—of phenomena and perspectives that cannot be fully adjusted to it." In short, conversations should not be silenced by
forcing all research into the same mold. The analysis of two
comparative world views in behavioral accounting research focuses on one aspect of methodological transference, namely
how the transference of protocols from one subdiscipline can
lead to the type of blindness that LaCapra warns can occur. This
leads to a lack of communication between the two schools due
to rhetorical arguments that discount the methods used by the
competing world views [Carlston, 1987].

10
This paper does not discuss cultural transference, but that problem should
be of concern to all accounting historians. See LaCapra [1985], who warns, that
the term culture often is used in a generic sense of a group with a shared
identity, i.e., the accounting profession, raising the very real danger that significant differences within that culture will be suppressed by assuming that the elite
is representative of the culture.
11
Berlin [1966] and Potter [1973] emphasize the dangers of being doctrinaire, i.e., making facts fit a theory, while Hansen [1979], Novick [1988], and
Porter [1981] focus primarily on positivists' claims that facts are neutral as a
more dangerous form of transference since the researcher becomes the arbiter
of reality imposing his or her own meaning on the facts.
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DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION
Ball and Foster [1982] examine several topics, related to
corporate financial reporting, and discuss four validity issues
[construct, internal, external, and statistical conclusion] that
arise in these studies. They outline two models that empiricists
might use to assess the impact of securities legislation. They
could [1] attempt to model events leading to the formation of
the SEC or [2] treat the SEC as an intrusive event in a static
social order. 12 To date, researchers have used the latter model.
This enables them to assume that formation of the SEC is an
appropriate operational proxy for the concept of disclosure
regulation and that "regulation can be operationalized as a zeroone variable switching in the early thirties" [Ball and Foster,
1982: p. 185].
From a historical perspective, the central issue is, did passage of legislation constitute an intrusive event, warranting
periodization? For the pre/post SEC dichotomy to be meaningful in a financial reporting context, passage of the legislation
should have changed pre SEC reporting relationships, i.e., management/auditor, management/stockholder, auditor/stockholder.
Passage of legislation does not by itself constitute a critical
event since as Edelman [1964] notes, legislation may be symbolic, designed to still public outrage without effecting substantive change. Merino and Neimark [1982] examined events leading to passage of securities legislation, concluding that the disclosure requirements of the legislation appeared to be designed
to maintain the status quo, i.e., to restore confidence in the
economic system, a conclusion consistent with symbolic regulation. Flesher and Flesher [1986] provide additional historical
support for the thesis that the 1933 Securities Act was designed
to support the status quo.
There are some excellent sequential accounts of the formation of the SEC, those studies identify a continuous pattern of
d e m a n d for increased disclosure that culminated in the passage
of regulation. 13 A limited review of the historical record here
12

Ball and Foster [1982: p. 178] note that modeling the phenomena that led
to the formation of the SEC would greatly increase the complexity of the analysis. See Benston [1969] and Chow [1983] for examples of research that adopts
the "static" model; see Merino, et. al. (1987) for criticism of that model. See
Flesher and Flesher [1986] for discussion of events leading to the formation of
the SEC.
13
See McGraw [1984], Parrish [1970], and Seligman [1982] for historical
analyses of disclosure legislation from different perspectives.
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does not duplicate these prior historical inquiries, it does, however, focus on actions in the period subsequent to passage of
legislation to highlight why the pre/post dichotomy appears to
be problematic. If that dichotomy does not hold, then both the
construct validity (does the experimental design employed allow
the researcher to test their theoretical variables) and the internal validity (has the group partitions/experimental groups allowed for an anticipated effect to occur) of the intrusive model
would be open to challenge since depiction of passage of legislation as a random event in a static social order would be inappropriate. If that is the case, then valid inferences cannot be
drawn from the empirics generated by the model. The approach
here in this paper examines implementation of the reporting
objectives of the legislation to address Porter's last question—
what happened or did not happen after passage of legislation?
Implementation

of Securities

Legislation

The stated objectives of the Securities Acts were to limit
managerial power, to promulgate uniform reporting rules and
to provide information that would be useful to investors for
decision making. The crucial historical question—were the
stated objectives implemented? A brief examination of the historical record suggests that the answer is no. The SEC clearly
did not promulgate uniform rules nor is there evidence managerial power had been limited. By 1939, managers seemed to have
more, not less, flexibility with respect to reporting practices. 14 If
Congressional intent had been to curb managerial power by restricting accounting choices, then the legislation does not seem
to have achieved that objective.
The SEC indicated that the political intent of the 1934 Act
was to "make available to the average investor honest and reliable information" for decision making [Kaplan and Reaugh,
1939, p. 35]. However, if that was the case, then the failure of
14

Part of this can be attributed to the legal liability imposed on auditors by
securities legislation, a brief review of the AIA/SEC literature shows that auditors did not seek to limit management's choices. The SEC accepted consistency,
which limited auditors' responsibilities, and conservatism, which Gilman [1939,
p. 248] concludes gave management the right to tell stockholder untruths about
their company, in lieu of uniformity. The SEC delegated authority for setting
accounting standards with the issuance of ASR #4, April 25, 1938 and by 1939,
the era of dirty surplus was in full bloom, see Previts and Merino [1979] for
discussion of the flexibility afforded managers.
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the legislators to require that corporations follow regulatory
standards in preparing annual reports is curious. Kaplan and
Reaugh [1939] point out that the SEC did not make filings easily accessible to "average" investors. SEC commissioners usually
referred to annual reports when they spoke of investors' access
to reliable data [Healy, 1938]. They certainly did not stress that
annual reports need not meet SEC disclosure standards. Regulators, like political reformers, may have assumed that the "average" investor could not benefit directly from financial data and
would have to rely on financial intermediaries. However, pluralistic democratic values may have precluded a direct statement
to this effect so that the emphasis was placed on disclosure as a
mechanism to create a "fair" game so that all could participate
in the nation's economic growth [Merino and Neimark, 1982].
Kaplan and Reaugh [1939] compared pre/post SEC annual
reports of companies that came under the SEC's jurisdiction.
They found a slight improvement in quality, but concluded that
overall annual reports did not contain sufficient disclosure to
render them interpretable. Even disclosure of basic items, such
as sales, did not improve significantly as 2 1 % of the 1939 corporate reports contained no sales data. In 1946, the SEC staff
investigated annual reports of Over-The-Counter companies
(OTC), cited numerous omissions, and concluded these reports
did not provide reliable data to investors. The report harshly
criticized audit firms for signing off on deficient reports that
might mislead the public. Auditors were outraged. They did not
dispute the SEC's findings with respect to the quality of OTC
reports, but they accused the SEC of hypocrisy, since the same
types of omissions existed in annual reports of companies under
the SEC's jurisdiction [Editorial, Journal of Accountancy, August
1946]. Maintaining the perception that investors could participate in a fair game seemed to be more important t h a n the
stated objective of actually providing reliable information to investors.
Implications

for Empirical

Research

The most fundamental question arises from the possibility
that legislation was symbolic, an act of political manipulation,
or as political persuasion, designed to change initial conditions
and preferences. If the reporting provisions of the legislation
were symbolic, then how do models that hold initial conditions
and preferences constant, assess the effect of that regulation?
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/12
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We suggest they cannot. In this case, the question is not
whether disclosure was an efficient means to reach comparable
objectives, but rather did it provide a mechanism to achieve a
particular political objective. Nelson [1989] suggests that Riker's
[1986] heresthetics (rhetoric by another name) political manipulation model might provide some useful insights about the role
of regulation.
On a more basic level, how can the results of the current
empirical models be interpreted if the assumptions of the models are questionable? First, if legislation did not result in significant changes in financial reporting, what do the results generated by a zero-one switching variable model mean? The legislation would appear to be an intervening variable. The empirics
would not test the impact of the legislation but some other unknown factors. Similarly, what do empirical tests of pre/post
SEC periods, based on a variable, such as sales, mean if that
data was still not publicly available after passage of legislation?
While the legislation did mandate sales disclosure, the SEC was
not anxious to be embroiled in controversy so it adopted a permissive attitude and allowed numerous confidentiality exceptions with respect to disclosure of sales data in its filings.15 It
seems likely that most of the companies that requested confidentiality exceptions were non-disclosure companies in both the
pre/post SEC period. Therefore, studies that use companies that
did not disclose sales, prior to regulation, as an experimental
group, assuming that they must have done so after passage of
legislation, may be making an invalid assumption. 16 If the experimental group contains companies not affected by regulation
(non-disclosure companies), then the empirical results do not
test the effect of securities regulation.
Suggestions for Future Historical Research
This essay focused on one issue, implementation of the ob15
Accountants strongly supported confidentiality exceptions; see for example, AIA Minutes [1936] where Wellington, Chairman of the AIA's Committee
on Cooperation with the SEC, applauded the fact that the SEC had shown some
leniency in allowing confidentiality exceptions; in the same year, the AIA issued
a pamphlet urging that the SEC become even more liberal in allowing confidentiality exceptions to income statement disclosures.
16
See Benston [1973] who uses companies that disclosed sales in 1929 as a
control group and non-disclosure companies as an experimental group to test
that efficiency of the legislation with respect to reduction of risk, i.e., variance
of stock market prices of each group, in 1935.
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jectives of legislation, there are other facets of "what did not
happen" after passage of legislation that also need further examination. For example, New Deal reformers, like Berle [1933]
and Douglas [1934], suggested that the 1933 Securities Act be
viewed as no more than a "modest start." Both suggested that it
would not be long before the government played a direct role in
investment banking by passage of a federal incorporation law,
which they viewed as salutary.
Prior to enactment of the 1934 Act, there was almost universal agreement among reformers that disclosure regulation
could not curb the power of those who controlled the nation's
corporations or protect investors. What role, if any, did the accounting practices, techniques, and discourses play in stemming
demands for more direct government oversight? What changed
reformers' attitudes, or did they change, with respect to the adequacy of disclosure as a regulatory device? Empirical tests do
not address the issue of what did not happen, but historical
inquiry need not be so limited.
From a critical perspective, a key question has to be, why
should disclosure legislation be assessed on an efficiency basis?
Brown [1989] discusses the "universalization of the economic,"
that makes all decisions, including ethical and political decisions, subject to economic calculation. He argues that for this to
be accomplished cultural barriers had to be broken down so
that all ends would appear to be comparable. This is crucial so
that all debate can be shifted to assessment of efficiency of various means to achieve comparable ends.
Tinker, et al. [1982] explain how this privileges a particular
type of research. In short, if ends are comparable, then research
that examines ends can be dismissed as subjective value judgments of the researcher; whereas, evaluation of alternative
means to assess the efficiency of obtaining comparable ends,
results in objective, factual research. However, if disclosure was
not viewed by reformers as a means to comparable ends, but
rather a way to achieve a specific political objective (a non comparable end), such as restoring the "moral" legitimacy of the
existing economic system, then empirical analyses that assess
disclosure on an economic efficiency basis will not tell a complete story.17
17
See Berle [1927] who concluded that the unbridled power exercised by
bankers and corporate managers could result in "private property passing out of
existence," he also lamented the fact that the courts refused to question account-
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Empirical models often may be too narrow to address complex accounting issues, but that does not mean that empirical
research has not raised some interesting questions for accounting historians. For example, Benston [1973, p. 218] found that
companies that did not disclose sales in 1929 were "better investments" than those that did, concluding that disclosure companies had "a greater real need to assure their stockholders of
their worth than those who did not." The authors of this paper
do not find Benston's [1973] results surprising, although we believe his conclusion as to why some companies voluntarily disclosed should be subject to closer scrutiny. Mattesich's [1976]
suggestion that full disclosure entails a "doctrine of concealment" might provide an interesting starting point, as might
Berle's [1927] contention that accounting practices enabled
managers to gain absolute power.
Critical researchers also have raised some interesting questions about disclosure. For example, Neu [1992] asks how was
regulation expected to restore investor confidence? We doubt
that empirical studies that assume that reformers sought to restore investor confidence by providing information that reduced
risk, measured by the variance in stock market prices, accurately capture political expectations; although that may be what
reformers should have done had they been instructed by economic rationality. Future accounting historical inquiries might
examine the political or moral rationale for securities* legislation
to address the question of political intent.
Neu [1992, p. 366] offers one suggestion, namely, that future researchers view regulation as a "textually mediated discourse" that structures social consciousness to create (political
persuasion) the impression that perceived inequities have been
corrected. Economists, who have recognized the multifaceted
nature of regulation, also recognize, although in a narrower
sense, the need to examine the political aspects of regulation.
For example, Stigler [1971] suggests that academic researchers
must try to determine when and why an industry (or a group
ing practices, which he claimed is how people gained power; see also Berle
[1928], who documents a series of cases that he deemed benefited bankers to
the detriment of absentee owners, i.e., stockholders. If political leaders perceived disclosure as the best means of persuading (political manipulation) the
public that powerholders could be controlled and private property rights restored, then the efficiency of that means becomes irrelevant since other ends are
not viewed as comparable.
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such as accountants) is able to use the state for its purposes or
when and how it is singled out by the state to be used for alien
purposes if they are to understand the regulatory process. Both
traditional and critical historical analyses of the above issues
would seem to be a necessary first step if accounting empirical
researchers are to develop models that result in "plausible" stories about the impact of securities legislation.
AUDITING AND AGENCY: SOME QUESTIONS
Ball and Foster [1982] do an excellent job in outlining the
methodological weaknesses of the "stewardship-contract monitoring paradigm." A similar historical analysis of the reasonableness of the relationships posited by the model would seem
to be in order. If these relationships (motivation and causality)
do not reasonably reflect actual relationships in a given time
period, then transference has occurred. If this happens, a model
has little explanatory power. While empiricists can credibly argue that the assumptions of a predictive model need not be
realistic, that argument becomes tenuous when a model is used
to explain a particular historical phenomenon. 1 8 The following
section briefly examines the stewardship and information hypotheses to highlight the types of questions that accounting historians might ask about the reasonableness of agency theory
explanations of the emergence of demands for audits.
Stewardship

Hypothesis

In its simplest form, the stewardship hypothesis states that
when a decision-making authority has been delegated to one
group [agent/manager], agents have incentives to seek monitoring agreements. They bargain with the principals to obtain such
agreements. 1 9 The incentives to bargain arise from the agents'
fears that principals will overestimate the a m o u n t that they
18
See Kaplan [1964] for discussion of why explanation is not the obverse of
prediction; while the term causality, consistently with the historical literature, it
does not mean to imply that empirical correlations can determine causality,
they can do no more than show association. It is the researcher that imputes
causality to the empirical evidence.
19
See Dugger's [1983] discussion of how contracting (bargaining) replaces
the invisible hand as the mechanism to justify laissez faire governmental policies;
see Merino [1993] for discussion of why pragmatists, like Dewey, viewed contracting as meaningless, stressing formal freedom over real freedom, and of
little value to those who had no power.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/12

16

Merino and Mayper: Accounting history and empirical research

Merino and Mayper: Accounting

History and Empirical Research

253

might appropriate and penalize them unduly. Thus, benefits exceed costs and voluntary monitoring occurs. 20
This hypothesis imputes a specific motivation [to control
the divergent self interest of principal and agent], infers a causal
factor [separation of ownership and control that results in divergent self interest of principal and agent], and a causal agent
[management] to explain the emergence of a particular phenomena, i.e., voluntary audits. If this hypothesis provides a
valid explanation of why independent audits became widely
used in the United States in the early decades of this century,
then a historical inquiry should show that corporations, characterized by separation of ownership and control and divergent
self interests, were most likely to be audited.
Unfortunately, most empirical studies use corporate size as
the proxy variable for separation of ownership and control. 21
Trusts were the largest corporations in our nation at the turn of
the century. Financial capitalists, like J. P. Morgan, who controlled a large number of trusts, also were pioneers in the use of
audits. If, as the brief overview of the historical record, below,
suggests, trusts did not reflect the relationships posited by
agency theorists, then the significant correlations found between size/audits should not be interpreted as providing support
for the stewardship hypothesis.
Historians generally have concluded that financial capitalists exercised absolute control over the trusts that they promoted. 22 Morgan [1913] made similar claims, stating that he
controlled both managers and Boards of Directors [stockholders] of the companies that he organized, absolutely. If this testimony and historians' conclusions are valid, then an autonomous managerial class did not exist in trusts. A nonexisting
group cannot be a causal agent. Nor would the posited motivation appear applicable to trusts; if financial capitalists exercised
absolute control over stockholders and managers, then it seems
unlikely that they incurred audit costs to control divergent self

20
See Williamson [1981] for historical overview, see Wallace [1980] and
DeAngelo [1981] for discussion of evolution of auditing from an economic perspective.
21
See Ball and Foster for discussion of the problem of size as a proxy variable; see Demski [1988] and Kelly [1983] for interpretive problems created by
use of size as a proxy variable in positive research.
22
See Edwards [1939], Galambos and Pratt [1988], and Fligstein [1990] for
historical interpretations of corporate control in the Progressive Era.
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interests. Alternative motivations for financial capitalists to incur audit costs are discussed later in this section of the paper,
after examining the information hypothesis, an alternative explanation for the emergence of audits.
Information

Hypothesis

In simplified terms, the information hypothesis assumes
that separation of ownership and control [causal factor] created
a demand for voluntary audits because investors [causal agents]
needed reliable financial information to determine market values [motivation]. The hypotheses implicitly assume that [1] voluntary audits resulted in financial data of sufficient reliability to
be used in decision making and, that [2] investors based investment decisions on intrinsic analysis.
A brief review of the historical record suggests that accounting historians might ask the following questions. Is it reasonable to assume that audits necessarily improved the reliability of financial statements? Or was Ripley [1927] correct when
he charged that audits simply served to mask the continuing
unreliability of financial statements? If his criticisms were not
valid, why did accountants concede he made valid points? [May,
1927, Wildman, 1928]. Were bankers correct in their assertions
that Uniform Accounting [1917] so eroded audit standards that
financial reports became increasingly unreliable throughout the
1920s? [AIA, 1923, Campbell, 1928]. Why, if audits emerged in
response to investors' needs for reliable information for decision
making, did investors not demand that companies disclose the
bases for valuation of various accounts so that they could interpret data? [Merino and Neimark, 1982]. A host of other questions could be raised, but until the above issues are resolved, the
information hypothesis should be regarded as conjectural. Thus,
interpretation of empirical results must be problematic since
the results support a number of alternative hypotheses, equally
well.
Alternative

Incentives

Merino and Neimark [1982] offered two alternative incentives, one economic (to market watered stock) and one political
(the desire to deter more draconic government regulation) that
may have motivated financial capitalists, who controlled trusts,
to incur audit costs during this period. The significant size/audit
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correlations that empiricists report are consistent with both the
watered stock and the political hypotheses. The alternative hypotheses have the added benefit of avoiding one of the inherent
contradictions in the historical record, the growing use of audits, purportedly for monitoring, accompanied by claims of the
increasing unreliability of financial reports. Neither the need to
market watered stock, nor the need to deter more draconic government intervention, required that audits result in more reliable information or that they be effective monitoring devices.
One could argue that from a financial capitalist's perspective,
ineffective audits were best as long as they created a perception
that monitoring was taking place. Providing reliable information probably was not a high priority for those marketing watered stock. Nor did audits have to have these attributes to meet
political demands for symbolic reassurance. If accounting researchers are to develop better empirical models, then a necessary first step may be that those models reflect the actual attributes of companies that were and were not audited at this
time. 23
Future Historical

Research

From a traditional historical perspective, any explanatory
study that is informed by a particular lens, such as agency
theory, creates concerns about imputation of current beliefs on
the past. The theories may offer partial explanations, but they
may be too narrow to furnish adequate explanations. Future
historians could make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the audit function if they examined the reasonableness of "economizing" various types of audit functions.
For example, the ongoing expectations gap may reflect the
failure to recognize that cost/benefit is not the primary concern
in many audit functions. The detection of fraud is used as an
23
For example, the Standard Oil Companies, among the largest in the nation
and the most widley held, were not audited with two exceptions until the 1930s;
but because they were traded in the unlisted department of the NYSE and the
financial press had a separate section for quotations of their stock, these companies probably do not appear in most empirical samples. None of the Standard
Oil Companies issued watered stock and most had an A common stock rating
(perhaps a least cost monitoring device?); Rockefeller had little use for auditors
and the companies he controlled had little trouble borrowing money or attracting investors without audits; SOC companies did provide extensive financial
data.
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example to indicate when prescriptions generated by empiricists
should be closely examined by historians, since those prescriptions may be irrelevant. It is trivially easy for empiricists to
show that it is not cost/beneficial (especially when the deterrent
effect of audits is not measured) for auditors to detect fraud. 24
Accounting historians need to point out that cost/benefit analysis is simply a statement of tradeoffs in values and that tradeoff
may not be acceptable unless it can be shown that detection of
fraud is an economizing decision.
If, however, ethical concerns predominate, then reduction
of detection of fraud to cost/benefit is inappropriate. One does
not have to adopt a critical perspective to challenge the relevance of cost/benefit in this case. Berle [1963] contended that
fraud jeopardized the underlying rationale for private property,
since there is no "moral" justification for allowing those in control to benefit by appropriating corporate resources that they do
not own. Means are not the issue, ends are. Maximization of
wealth is not comparable to maintaining the "moral" legitimacy
of private property rights.
Traditional histories could be particularly beneficial by
pointing out the circumstances and conditions that lead to acceleration of demands that auditors assume greater responsibility for detection of fraud. For example, merger movements
could be perceived to strengthen managerial control; therefore,
it would be useful to know if periods of rapid merger activity
result in greater demands being placed upon auditors to be
more vigilant in their efforts to detect managerial fraud. For
over a century, auditors and the public have been at odds about
issues such as detection of fraud, perhaps it is time to stop
trying to educate the public as to the limitations of audits and
take time to educate accountants as to the conditions that make
political or ethical considerations of primary concern and economic considerations secondary.
There is a rich body of critical auditing research that should
provide new insights for all accounting historians. This research
has questioned the fundamental claims that auditors make to
professional status [Hopwood, 1990, Willmott, 1991], questioned the value of audits [Humphrey and Mozier, 1990], and

24

See Watts [1980], who discusses Pareto optimality, but reduces detection
of fraud to cost/benefit analysis, concluding it is not cost beneficial for auditors
to be expected to detect fraud.
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effectively challenged the depiction of auditors and accountants
as "neutral" observers [Tinker, 1985, Hines, 1989]. Hooks [1992]
shows that audit actions and behavior are consistent with several social theories, raising a fundamental challenge to empirical research. Given that a critical mass of both empirical and
critical work now exists, a comparative analysis of specific audit
functions would seem to be useful, not only to broaden understanding of the current state of knowledge but also to assess the
persuasiveness of the arguments offered from a historical perspective.
COMPETING WORLD VIEWS AND
BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
Ball and Foster [1982] outline six world views in financial
reporting as a partial explanation of why empirical research has
not generated plausible stories. D'Agostino's [1985] excellent
analysis of comparative world views in historical linguistics provides a n example of how historians might assess Ball and
Foster's [1982] contention. 25 However, to examine six views in
this m a n n e r would entail another paper, since one would first
have to determine if six world views exist, which is problematic,
and then assess the impact of each. The concern here is to demonstrate how methodological transference stops conversations
in accounting by examining two world views within behavioral
accounting. Both views are consistent with the basic functionalist paradigm of empirical research that has been discussed previously.
Understanding
the history of alternative methodologies
(which may lead to dominant schools of thought) may enhance
the communication and narrow the differences between competing methodologies in accounting. Bazerman [1987] states
that a research community will gain "confidence" in its prescriptions and "stability of text" when researchers share a belief
that there is "one right way" to acquire knowledge. However,
this tends to silence creativity and alternative views. An understanding of the history of alternative methodologies may enable
researchers to overcome a close minded view of knowledge acquisition.
25 Paradigmatic analysis provides an alternative method of examining these
world views, see Glautier [1984] and Wells [1976], but the two views discusses
here appear to be within a functioning paradigm.
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Historical methodology also stresses the importance of being sensitive to the surrounding environment. It is critical for all
researchers, whether using archival data or doing a laboratory
experiment, to take into account the conditioning environment
that they are trying to understand and relate this environment
to their assumptions, research questions, and research design.
The researcher needs to ask: given the environment, do my
assumptions, questions, and design make sense? In short, are
they appropriate? The researcher must also evaluate the conditions in which the findings will be upheld and under what conditions will the findings not be upheld [Ijiri, 1972]. These questions are critical to current behavioral accounting research. For
example, in cognitive psychology there are two schools of
thought to the methodological approaches with respect to the
study of h u m a n memory, the Ebbinghaus [1885] approach and
the Bartlett [1932] approach. Ebbinghaus's methodology emphasizes internal validity, control and experimental simplification; whereas Bartlett's method emphasizes the complexity of
h u m a n memory, the need to examine h u m a n memory with
complex material, and introspection. 26 Both approaches have influenced behavioral accounting researchers (the latter represented by protocol analysis studies and the former by many
laboratory controlled experiments).
Accounting researchers have argued about the rigor and validity of two approaches; with most discounting the introspective approach. Nevertheless, observation of cognitive theories
will show a n integration of b o t h m e t h o d s in their models
[Crowder, 1976]. By ignoring this integration, Hogarth [1991]
suggests that accounting researchers are only concerned with
replicating the cognitive experimental research in a sterile accounting setting. These replications tell us that accountants are
like or not like other individuals when it comes to decision biases. However, Hogarth [1991] avers that researchers need to go
beyond the dominant schools of thought and integrate ideas
from all schools, with a clear understanding of the specific context of the research. This will allow researchers to address problems that are relevant to their discipline rather than do minor
extensions of the psychology literature. The accounting litera26

Introspection is a term that has been "disreputable" in behaviorism but has
been allowed to come out of the "closet" under alternative metaphors such as
"self-reports," "verbal" protocols, etc.; see Carlston, p. 150 for further elaboration.
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ture is at least beginning to consider the merits of a multiple
approach [Gibbins and Jamal, forthcoming].
Another example is the criticism of the Lens model approach used in much behavioral accounting research. It is said
the Lens model is dead in accounting since it represents a static
model in designing experiments. However, Brunswik [1952]
never intended the Lens model to be a static model. Brunswik
emphasized the need to develop representative research designs.
He explicitly states you cannot ignore the environment in which
learning takes place. The Lens model itself should not be considered static, researchers just need to develop dynamic experiments, using a representative design. For example, audit judgment researchers may consider conducting field experiments;
using the natural auditing environment and observing the type
of information acquired rather than providing all the relevant
information in a factorial design and sterile environment.
Finally, accounting behavioral researchers (as well as psychology researchers) tend to get mired and narrowed by their
own rhetoric. Researchers limit experimental reports to convincing reviewers and readers of their methodological competence rather than providing intellectual arguments to "persuade
readers of the truth of an idea" [Bazerman, 1987, p. 140]. Reviewers concentrate on methodological weaknesses with little
c o n s i d e r a t i o n for u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d solving p r o b l e m s . As
Bazerman [1987] points out, this may be due to the constraints
on what is considered to be the "appropriate" experiment reporting style. Accounting behavioralists borrow from the underlying sub-areas of psychology. In doing so, they adopt the language of the sub-area. Attribution studies consider "implicit personality theory" whereas cognitive studies talk about "schemas;"
these terms essentially mean the same thing (how an individual
represents another event or individual), but the two areas of
psychology do not communicate with each other [Carlston,
1987]. Specific metaphors are useful for those who understand
the language, but they may also "obscure alternative interpretations" and lead readers to accept research findings without adequate evidence [Carlston, 1987, p. 153].
Future Historical/Behavioral

Research

The above indicates that having an understanding of historical methodology, which stresses the importance of sensitivity to the context, surrounding environment, and motivations
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may be critical to developing more robust behavioral accounting models. Accounting historians and behavioralists can also
join together and conduct studies which provide the historical
back drop for alternative behavioral models, intent of the language and metaphors used in the various sub-areas, and the
intended boundaries and overlap of the competing schools of
thought. Another important aspect of such an analysis would be
to point out the critical need to validate the reasonableness of
the a s s u m p t i o n s underlying any experimental or empirical
model.
CONCLUSION
This article attempted to show how historical inquiry might
be used to assess the reasonableness of stories empiricists tell.
The brief historical analysis of securities legislation was designed to point out why the pre/post SEC dichotomy appears
questionable. If the reporting objectives of the legislation were
not implemented, then the legislation may have been symbolic.
This not only raises questions about interpretation of the findings of empirical models, but also about the adequacy of models
that hold initial conditions and preferences constant. Riker's
heresthetics (political manipulation) provides one possible alternative for future accounting empirical researchers working
within the functionalist paradigm. Historical inquiries that examine the political and moral rationales for securities legislation might add valuable insights about disclosure legislation
that would enable members of the accounting profession to better understand the complex functions that accounting has in
contemporary society.
The examination of agency theory explanation of the emergence of audits in the United States suggests that belief transference (imposition of current beliefs on prior periods) has occurred since the economic incentives posited by the model do
not seem to fit actual relationships at the turn of the century.
The empirical results appear uninterpretable since the most significant correlations (size/audits) support alternative hypotheses, exogenous to agency theory, equally well. Future accounting historical inquiries need to consider the possibility that political and moral incentives have created demands for audits. If
accounting researchers continue to focus solely on the economic aspects of auditing, then the expectations gap between
the accounting profession and the public that has existed for
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more t h a n a century should be expected to continue. Perhaps it
is time to try to educate accountants about the complex, interactive nature of the accounting discipline, rather than trying to
educate the public about its limitations.
This examination of behavioral accounting research shows
that it relies on methodological transference from psychology.
The dangers of this transference is that researchers will be: 1)
insensitive to the changes in the underlying discipline; 2) insensitive to the specific context and problems that are being examined; and 3) blinded by the rhetoric of the mother discipline,
exhibiting intolerance for alternative interpretations and methods. Historical inquiries that highlight the contextual limitation
of various world views may help accounting behavioralists to
obtain a better understanding of the boundaries of their methods and the context of the problems they address.
Future Historical

Inquiries

Traditional historical analyses serve a valuable function in
that they enhance understanding of how the accounting discipline has arrived at the current state of knowledge. By expanding the parameters of analysis, historical inquiries can create
discomfort and uncertainty about what are held to be "certified"
truths. Questions, such as, under what conditions and circumstances is it appropriate to assume that promoting economic
efficiency is the primary accounting/auditing function, when is
it not, certainly deserve the attention of accounting historians.
This paper suggests two areas, disclosure regulation and detection of fraud, where economic efficiency may be irrelevant because society may reject "economizing," i.e., reducing political
and ethical objectives to economic decisions, as inappropriate.
A rhetorical examination of how accounting discourses, practices, and techniques fit into the what Brown [1989] calls the
universalization of the economic incentives simply may be fruitful.
Another question, related to empirical work, that was not
addressed, but that needs to be addressed, is the relevance of
the classificatory generalizations used in accounting research.
Empiricists implicitly assume homogeneity of interests among
groups, such as investors. Given the dynamic changes in the
economic structure during this century, those classifications,
which have not changed, may mask important conflicts that
now need to be considered. For example, is it reasonable to
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assume commonality of interests between current and potential
investors or between "average" and institutional investors? Neu
[1992] conducted a case study to show the differential impact
that the bankruptcy of a company had on various investors in a
new issue of that company. He concludes that accounting regulations did not protect all investors equally well. Accountants
need general historical inquiries that specifically look at the
question of the adequacy of current classifications, and specific
case studies that look at the impact of accounting techniques
and practices on particular subunits within each user group.
Accounting historians can make an important contribution by
providing a more realistic picture of the current state of the
discipline and by pointing out contradictions that exist between
what academic researchers assume and actual economic relationships in contemporary society. This picture should consider
both institutions and individuals. This may help empiricists to
tell more plausible stories and behavioralists to experiment on
more relevant problems.
The message of this essay is simple—accounting academics
need to celebrate diversity and keep conversations open. Critical
historical research has provided important new insights by rendering the familiar, strange; while traditional historical inquiries render the familiar, intelligible. If accounting empirical research has not been convincing because empirical researchers
do not tell plausible stories, as Ball and Foster [1982] suggest,
then accounting historical studies may provide a means of developing more robust models. To paraphrase Bronowski [1965],
no research community can survive without trust and respect
among its participants since all researchers are dependent to
some degree on the work of those who have preceded them.
Commitment to scientific values, rather than to a particular
method or a particular theory, promotes creativity and novelty.
As Bronowski [1965] astutely notes, what other disciplines can
learn from the success of the scientific research community is
not its techniques but its spirit—the irresistible need to explore.
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